The effect of national discretions on banks by Argimón Maza, Isabel & Ruiz, Jenifer
THE EFFECTS OF NATIONAL 
DISCRETIONS ON BANKS
Isabel Argimón and Jenifer Ruiz
Documentos de Trabajo 
N.º 1029
2010
THE EFFECTS OF NATIONAL DISCRETIONS ON BANKS 
 THE EFFECTS OF NATIONAL DISCRETIONS ON BANKS (*) 
Isabel Argimón (**) 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 
Jenifer Ruiz 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
 
 
(*) This paper is the sole responsibility of its authors and the views represented here do not necessarily reflect those of 
the Banco de España. We would like to thank A. Bernad, C. Lozano, A. Martín, F. Rodríguez, an anonymous referee and
J. Suárez for their help and suggestions. 
(**) Contact address: isabel.argimon@bde.es. Departamento de Estabilidad Financiera. 
 
 
Documentos de Trabajo. N.º 1029 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and finance. All papers 
have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute 
to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international 
environment. 
 
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, 
therefore, do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. 
 
 
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the INTERNET at the 
following website: http://www.bde.es. 
 
 
 
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is 
acknowledged. 
 
© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2010 
 
ISSN: 0213-2710 (print) 
ISSN: 1579-8666 (on line) 
Depósito legal: M. 40346-2010      
Unidad de Publicaciones, Banco de España
Abstract 
The EU’s transposition of Basel II into European law has been done through the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD). Although the Directive establishes, in general, uniform rules 
to set capital requirements across European countries, there are some areas where the 
Directive allows some heterogeneity. In particular, countries are asked to choose among 
different possibilities when transposing the Directive, which are called national discretions 
(ND). The main objective of our research is to use such observed heterogeneity to gather 
empirical evidence on the effects on European banks of more or less stringency and more or 
less risk sensitivity in capital requirements. Following the approach in Barth et al. (2004, 
2006, 2008) we build index numbers for groups of national discretions and applying 
Altunbas et al. (2007) approach, we provide evidence on their effect on banks’ risk, capital, 
efficiency and cost. We show that more stringency and more risk sensitivity in regulation not 
always result in a trade off between efficiency and solvency: the impact depends on the area 
of national discretion on which such characteristics apply. 
Keywords: Prudential regulation; capital requirements; bank capital; risk; efficiency. 
JEL classification: E61, G21, G28. 
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1 Introduction 
The EU’s transposition of Basel II into European law was done through the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD). Although the Directive establishes, in general, uniform rules 
to set capital requirements across European countries, there were some areas where the 
Directive allowed some heterogeneity. In particular, countries were asked to choose among 
different possibilities when transposing the Directive, which are called options and national 
discretions. Countries made use of this possibility and we observe that different choices were 
made, so that these options and national discretions (ND) were exercised. It can be expected 
that these different choices reflect different regulatory preferences and, therefore, if regulation 
is effective it can also be expected that these choices lead to different bank results. 
The theoretical academic literature produces highly mixed predictions regarding the 
effects of capital regulation on asset risk and overall safety and soundness for the banking 
system as a whole, so that it mainly remains an empirical issue. However, regulators’ 
expectation is that tighter capital requirements, if effective, should lead to higher capital and 
lower risk taking. The idea is that if banks hold sufficient capital, they internalize the adverse 
consequences of gambling and thus will choose to invest prudently. On the other hand, such 
tightness could lead to higher inefficiency, which could show in lower profits or higher costs, 
although evidence has been also gathered on the opposite effect [Berger (1995)]. Moreover, a 
more risk sensitive capital framework, if effective, should result in lower risk and/or higher 
capital, with costs in terms of efficiency as well. 
A fair amount of empirical work has already been done on the impact of banking 
regulation on banking system stability, while there is very little systematic empirical evidence 
on how regulation affects risk taking, capital and efficiency banking industry. This paper tries 
to address this gap. The large cross-country database on bank regulation and supervision 
that has been gathered in different waves by the IMF has allowed the analysis of the effects 
of the regulatory and supervisory arrangements on the development of the financial sector 
and on the stability and efficiency of the banking system [Barth et al. (2004, 2006 and 2008) 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004)]. Through the construction of regulatory indices, the works 
of Barth et al. found that more stringency in capital regulations does not seem to have a 
statistically significant effect on banking-system fragility, neither on bank development, nor on 
efficiency or costs. 
The objective of our paper is to test whether this lack of effect holds when 
we consider more disaggregated information in relation to capital requirements, that is, 
at the level where many regulatory decisions are taken. In particular, we make use of the 
heterogeneity provided by the choice of national discretions in CRD to gather empirical 
evidence on the impact on European banks of more or less stringency and more or less 
risk sensitivity in capital requirements. We focus on the potential effects that these options 
and discretions may have on the risk, capital, costs and efficiency of individual banks. 
By carrying out this analysis, we provide evidence on whether there is a trade-off 
between solvency and efficiency caused by more stringency or by more risk sensitivity 
in capital requirements. To do so, we assume that the choice of National Discretions 
made by Member States reflects not only the regulator’s most preferred option, but also the 
regulation closest to the one that they already had in place before CRD was adopted. 
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In this sense, we are not aiming at testing the impact of the introduction of national 
discretions, but their role in banking results and activity. The analysis also allows us to provide 
an estimate of the impact of different choices as far as risk sensitivity and stringency in 
capital requirements is concerned and in particular in relation to the initial proposal made by 
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) in October 2008. 
We follow the approach in Barth et al. (2004, 2006 and 2008), and construct indices 
of national discretions in bank capital regulation for all 27 EU countries and we test for their 
relevance on bank’s risk, capital and efficiency. We study the impact for the whole sample of 
banks, including commercial, saving and cooperative banks. 
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
concerning the effects of capital regulation on bank’s risk, capital and efficiency. Section 3 
describes the data and specifically the construction of the National Discretion indices 
while Section 4 focuses on the methodological framework. Section 5 presents the results and 
Section 6 records the simulations. Finally, section 7 summarizes and concludes. Annex 1 
contains a description of the National Discretions, while Annex 2 provides the estimation for 
the efficiency variable and Annex 3 records the detaled tables with the estimation results for 
the capital, risk, cost and efficiency equations. 
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2 Literature review 
Although there is extensive theoretical literature on bank capital, it is much scanter the one 
that takes into account the presence of financial regulation [see Van Hoose (2007) and Santos 
(2001) for a survey of theories of bank behaviour under capital regulation]. And this happens 
in spite of the fact that banking is undoubtedly one of the most regulated industries in 
the world, and the rules on bank capital are one of the most prominent aspects of such 
regulation. 
Given that the regulatory requirement depends on the amount of loans granted, 
a link between bank capital and lending is established. There is a widespread agreement 
in the available theoretical literature that the immediate effects of constraining capital 
standards are likely to be a reduction in total lending and accompanying increases in market 
loan rates and substitution away from lending to holding alternative assets.1 
This literature produces highly mixed predictions, however, regarding the effects of 
prudential regulation on banks' risk-taking profile  and on overall safety and soundness 
for the banking system as a whole [Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)]. In particular, theoretical 
contributions do not agree on the impact of more risk sensitive capital requirements on 
portfolio choices and on efficiency. Although the effects of capital adequacy requirements are 
usually to decrease risk taking, the reverse is also possible [Kim and Santomero (1988), 
Rochet (1992), Besanko and Kanatas (1996)].2 
The impact of capital requirements on bank capital and credit risk depends on the 
extent to which such requirements are binding. Some of the empirical research carried out to 
determine whether this is the case seems to support the view that regulatory capital has 
an impact on the capital held by banks [Ediz et al. (1998), Alfon et al. (2004), Francis and 
Osborne (2009a)]. In fact, the claim that, since most banks already hold capital quite well in 
excess of the regulatory minimum, any change in it will not have any effect on banks’ capital 
is not supported by the results for the UK in the works of Alfon et al. (2004) and Francis and 
Osborne (2009a and 2009b), the ones in Van Roy (2008) with data for six G-10 countries 
(Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) or the findings in 
Rime (2001) for Switzerland. As for risk-based capital ratios, they have been shown to lead 
to significant increases in capital ratios [Jacques et Nigro (1997)] in relation to a non 
risk-sensitivity baseline. However, Ashcraft (2001) finds little evidence that capital regulation 
during the 1980s materially influenced bank capital ratios. In the same vein, Barrios and 
Blanco (2003) find that for Spanish banks, a market-based model better fits the data, 
indicating that the banks they considered were not at all constrained by capital regulation 
during the period of study. 
Empirical evidence is provided for the irrelevance of stringency in capital regulation 
for bank development and stability [Barth et al. (2004, 2006 and 2008)], while more stringent 
capital regulations are negatively linked with nonperforming loans [Barth et al. (2008)]. 
                                                                          
1. Jackson et al (1999) reach the same conclusion as far as empirical evidence is concerned. 
2. For example, using the mean-variance framework, Kahane (1977), Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and 
Santomero (1988) have shown that increased regulatory capital standards may have the unintended effect of 
causing utility-maximizing banks to increase portfolio risk. The results in Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley 
and Furlong (1990) suggest that increased capital standards will not cause banks to increase portfolio risk, because an 
increase in capital reduces the value of the deposit insurance put option. 
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However, the evidence on the impact of capital adequacy requirements on financial 
stability has been usually obtained under an event-based approach, which identifies crisis 
only when they are severe enough to trigger market events. In contrast, crises successfully 
contained by corrective policies are neglected, so that estimation suffers from selection bias 
[von Hagen and Ho (2007)]. Using a Markov-switching regression model to deal with this bias, 
the results in Tchana Tchana (2008) show that capital adequacy requirements improve 
stability and reduce the expected duration of banking crises. 
The possible distortions arising from regulatory capital pressure has been analysed 
in some papers. Editz et al. 1998 find no evidence that an increase in the minimum 
bank-specific capital ratio prevalent in the UK causes a bank to shift into less risky asset risk 
buckets. A similar result is obtained in Rime (2001), where it is shown that regulatory pressure 
does not affect the level of risk in Swiss banks. On the other hand, González (2002) provides 
evidence that banks in countries with stricter regulation have a lower charter value, which 
increases their incentives to follow risky policies, a similar result to the one found by 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992). The evidence gathered on the impact of risk sensitivity capital 
requirements on risk taking points at a negative relationship with data on the introduction 
of Basel I [Thakor (1996)], which is also supported by the work of Jacques and Nigro (1997). 
As for the effects of regulation on performance and costs, the results in 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004), indicate that tighter regulations on bank entry and on bank 
activities boost the cost of financial intermediation. In contrast, Berger (1995) finds that there 
is positive Granger- causation from capital to bank earnings, through lower interest rates paid 
on uninsured purchased funds, while Barth et al. (2006 and 2008) results dos not capture any 
effect, so that capital regulation does not impact on efficiency. 
Therefore, the gathered empirical evidence produces rather mixed results as far as 
the effects of capital regulation on bank’s behaviour. 
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3 Data 
Four main different sources of data are used for the empirical analysis. We first exploit 
the data on how each Member State (MS) has exercised each national discretion, which is 
obtained from the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) website3 and which 
we detail below. We also use aggregate country data describing several characteristics 
and reflecting the structure and operation of the national banking system for 2007, which are 
obtained from the European Central Bank (we use the data contained in both the 2007 
European Banking Structures Report and the 2007 Banking Sector Stability Report).  We also 
use the Barth, Caprio, Levine (2008) database to capture institutional features of the 
regulatory and supervisory framework. And finally, individual bank data for 2007 (and other 
years when needed to construct the variable) are obtained from the BankScope database, 
which is provided by Fitch-IBCA. Data are for all financial institutions (commercial banks, 
saving banks and cooperatives) with accounting data for 2007 from consolidated accounts 
if available, and from unconsolidated accounts otherwise. 
Our final data set consists of 2108 financial institutions from 27 countries for year 
2007, which comprises 267 commercial banks, 379 saving banks and 1458 cooperatives. 
3.1 Construction of National Discretion indices 
MS have a choice of more than 150 national discretions and options in the Capital 
Requirements Directive, which may be applied on the basis of national circumstances and 
which cover a rather wide scope of areas within the Directive.4 
To carry out the empirical analysis, we picked up 53 of these national discretions for 
which we could clearly identify whether its adoption implied more or less stringency 
in regulation or more or less risk sensitive than the benchmark given by the Directive.5 
We include a description of each ND in Annex I. 
For each country, the CEBS’ data reflects whether the discretion has been exercised 
or not (YES/NO answer) by each one of the EU countries. Thus, most of the national 
discretions can be specified as simple zero/one variables. In general, we assign a value of 1 
when the answer reflects a more stringent regulatory treatment or when it implies a more risk 
sensitive approach6 than the benchmark provided by the Directive.  We group the responses 
provided by the MS into aggregate indexes that we define below. 
We first group national discretions in two main categories, depending on whether 
they affect the stringency or the risk sensitivity of regulation. This aggregation allows us to 
analyse the impact of overall stringency (ST) and overall risk sensitivity (RS) on bank’s risk, 
capital and efficiency. 
Alternatively, we group ND in a more disaggregated form, defined in relation to the 
regulatory areas that they cover. Following CEBS, we distinguish the areas of own funds (OF), 
                                                                          
3. http://www.c-ebs.org/Publications/Consultation-Papers/All-consultations/CP11-CP20/CP18.aspx. 
4. See Annex 1 for a short description of the National Discretions included in the empirical part. 
5. There are 11 transitional discretions that could also be classified, but because of their temporary nature have not been 
included in the analysis. 
6. More risk sensitivity does not necessarily imply a greater stringency in terms of capital requirements, as this will 
depend on the financial institutions’ risk profile. 
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scope of application (S), credit risk under the standard approach (CRSA), credit risk under the 
Internal Ratings-Based approach (IRB),7 Counterparty risk (CRD) and Operational Risk (OR).8 
CRSA, IRB and CRD are, in fact, split in two: one covering stringency (XX_ST), and the other 
risk sensitivity (XX_RS). The actual number of national discretions included in each group 
is different and spans from as few as one in CRD_RS or two in CRD_ST to as much as 14 in 
CRSA_ST, as the last line in Table 1 records. The aggregate index ST is obtained from the 
sum of all the indices that cannot be split plus the ST part of those that can. The aggregate 
index RS is obtained as the sum of those that have been classified as RS. 
Following Barth et al. (2004), we use two methods to construct the indices for 
regulatory stringency and risk sensitivity that incorporate the answers to several of the ND. 
First, we simply add the individual zero/one answers, so that a higher value of the index 
implies higher stringency in the regulation of the area or higher risk sensitivity, if risk is the 
issue. The drawback of this method is that it gives equal weight to each of the components in 
constructing the index. The second method involves calculating the first principal component 
of the underlying ND, to obtain a principal component with mean zero and standard 
deviation one. The advantage over the simple aggregation is that no equal weights to the 
different ND are assumed. The disadvantage is that it does not allow assessing the impact 
of a change in a specific ND used for the construction of the index. 
Using the equiponderated aggregation we observe (Graph 1) that no MS has chosen 
a combination of National Discretions that implies either most stringency (value of 41) or most 
risk sensitivity (value of 10). On the other hand, none has either chosen an overall combination 
of most lenient treatment or least risk sensitivity and only five of the twenty-seven MS present 
a stringency index whose value is over half the maximum and eleven whose value for risk 
sensitivity is above half the maximum value. We observe that MS that have joined the EU 
in recent years, with a few exceptions, tend to have chosen more stringent and more 
risk sensitive national discretions than former members. 
                                                                          
7. To measure its credit risk for regulatory purposes, the bank can use three approaches: the standardized approach, 
the foundation internal ratings based approach (IRB), and the advanced IRB approach: (i) the standardized 
approach uses only a predetermined risk weight for different types of loans; (ii) the model underlying the internal 
ratings based approach is the one-factor Gaussian copula model of time to default 
8. The equiponderated indices for each country are recorded in Table A1 in Annex 1. 
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Graph 1. National Discretion Indices: risk sensitivity and stringency
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For the rest of the paper, following the approach in the works of Barth et al. 
(2004, 2006 and 2008), we only report the results obtained with the principal components 
index. 
The simple correlation between the different indices in the different countries is in 
general low (Table 1), reflecting that the choice made by MS in relation to the ND is rather 
diverse. Moreover, the area of counterparty risk (CRD) tends to show a negative correlation 
with the rest of areas, which may result from some sort of substitutability between areas. 
The highest values for the correlations (above 50%) can be found between the areas of Own 
Funds and Scope, Operational Risk and Scope, and Operational Risk and the Standard 
Approach indices. 
 
 
OF
OF 1 S
S 0.576 1 CRSA_ST
CRSA_ST 0.310 0.409 1 CRSA_RS
CRSA_RS 0.007 ‐0.313 ‐0.007 1 CRD_ST
CRD_ST ‐0.115 ‐0.348 ‐0.309 0.238 1 CRD_RS
CRD_RS ‐0.420 ‐0.341 ‐0.455 0.143 0.522 1 IRB_ST
IRB_ST 0.485 0.443 0.444 ‐0.198 ‐0.080 ‐0.467 1 IRB_RS
IRB_RS 0.302 0.159 0.158 ‐0.107 0.242 ‐0.090 0.279 1 OR
OR 0.155 0.501 0.527 ‐0.168 ‐0.170 0.015 0.416 0.240 1
# ND 4 7 14 4 2 1 12 6 3
Table 1
CORRELATIONS AMONG ND INDICES
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4 Methodological framework 
All Member States should have transposed the new Directive by the end of 2007, and, 
therefore, banks should have been operating under the new regulatory framework by that 
year.9 Based on the assumption that regulation is very persistent in time [Barth et al. (2006)], 
so that it takes time for a country to change dramatically its regulatory system, we can also 
assume that countries exercised, for each national discretion, the option more similar to the 
regulation in force before 2007. National Discretions can, thus, be regarded as reflecting 
current practices in the countries that apply them, as their existence in the Directive is justified 
on the grounds that they try to accommodate different regulatory approaches. In that sense, 
the analysis we carry out is not about the impact of the new regulation but of the regulation 
itself. 
The empirical analysis proposes testing whether bank risk, efficiency, costs and 
capital are affected by the characteristics of these national discretions, taking into account 
other features of the functioning of the countries. In particular, the following regression model 
is estimated to capture the impact of National Discretions on bank’s risk, capital and 
efficiency: 
Yjn = α + β NDn + γ COUNTRYn + λ CONTROLjn + εjn [1] 
 
Where n indexes country n, and j indexes bank j. 
Moreover, Yjn is either RISKjn , the observed value of the measure of risk chosen for 
the jth bank operating in country n, or CAPITALjn , the amount of capital that a bank holds, or 
INEFFICIENCYjn , the observed value of the measure of inefficiency for the jth bank in country 
n; NDn is the vector of National Discretions; COUNTRYn is a vector of country specific 
variables, CONTROLjn is the vector of control variables that are bank specific and that differ 
depending on the variable that is being explained; α, β, γ, λ are the regression coefficients and 
εjn is the disturbance term. Our focus of attention will be the sign and statistical significance of 
the β coefficients. If β has a statistically significant negative sign in the risk equation and/or a 
positive sign in the capital equation, we can say that the corresponding ND has a positive 
impact on solvency. Moreover, if β has a statistically significant positive sign in the inefficiency 
equation, we can say that the corresponding ND has a negative impact on efficiency. 
Following Altunbas et al. (2007) we specify a system of equations and estimate these 
using Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) approach. This allows for considering 
the possibility of correlated errors between the equations as we are using the same 
accounting data in all of them, while controlling for relevant variables, whether country or 
bank-specific. 
4.1 The dependent variables 
We proxy INEFFICIENCY with two variables: 
                                                                          
9. The only exceptions were Malta, Spain and Greece, which transposed the directive a year later. 
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ACjn: Average costs obtained as the ratio of total costs (overhead costs + interest 
expenses) divided by total assets. 
INEFTjn: cost inefficiency measure. It is obtained as the distance of a firm’s observed 
operating costs to the minimum or “best practice” efficient cost frontier. It is derived from 
the estimation of a stochastic cost frontier using a translog specification, whose details can 
be found in Annex 2. 
As for RISK, we proxy it with: 
LOLPTAjn: Loan loss provisions over total assets.10 It is derived from accounting 
information so that it has the limitations inherent to such kind of data, of being backward 
looking. Higher levels of provisions are suggestive of greater banking risk. 
And for CAPITAL we use: 
ETAjn: the ratio of book value of equity to total assets, where equity includes 
preferred shares and common equity. 
4.2 The control variables 
As it is crucial to use a variety of control variables and sensitivity checks to mitigate problems 
while interpreting the findings, we propose including the following: 
Bank size. As a measure of size we use the natural log of total assets for bank j 
in country n (SIZEjn). As pointed out by McAllister and McManus (1993), larger banks have 
better risk diversification opportunities and thus lower cost of funding than smaller ones. 
On the other hand, the “too-big-to-fail” argument suggests that larger banks would benefit 
from an implicit guarantee that, other things equal, decreases their cost of funding and 
allows them to invest in riskier assets. Previous empirical evidence on this issue produced 
ambiguous results. We also include bank size squared (SIZE2jn) to capture any non linearity 
in the relationship. 
Fee income. As a measure of banks’ different product mixes we include the variable 
FEESjn that equals non-interest-operating income divided by total assets. Since banks engage 
in different non-lending activities, these other activities may influence the pricing of loan 
products due to cross-subsidization of bank products. Thus, we include fee income to control 
cross-bank differences in the products offered by banks. 
Bank liquidity. The bank liquidity is proxied with the ratio of liquid assets to costumer 
and short term deposits for bank j in country n (LIQUIDjn). We could expect that banks with a 
high level of liquid assets will receive lower interest income than banks with less liquid assets. 
Moreover, although it need not reflect a more efficient asset allocation, liquidity could affect 
efficiency. 
Bank loans. We use the change in total net loans to total assets as the measure 
of bank’s lending activity (TNLTAjn). Loans might be more profitable than other types of 
assets such as securities. Loans might be more costly to produce than other types of assets. 
                                                                          
10. A similar measure (with reserves) is used by Altunbas et al. (2007). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 18 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1029 
Moreover, we can expect that the more loans a bank makes to the retail or the corporate 
sector, the higher the risk tolerance of bank managers. 
Shadow banking. We include a proxy for shadow banking as we can expect that 
its size can affect the capacity of the regulatory framework to impact the banks 
performance and results. We proxy it with the ratio of off balance sheet items divided 
by off balance sheet items + total assets, as it reflects the weight of off-balance sheet items 
in a bank (OFFBALRjn). 
Return on assets. In the capital equation we also include a proxy of bank profits 
(ROAAjn), which is the computed return on average assets that is available in the Bankscope 
dataset. 
4.3 The country variables 
We control for the following country variables: 
COIRC : Cost-to-income ratio (% of total income) to control for banking efficiency 
OEPOAC: Total expenses (% of total assets), which should account for production 
costs in the banking system. 
GDP: The national GDP growth rate, which should account for the impact of the 
economic cycle on bank performance. 
HERFINDAHL. It is the Herfindahl index that should cover for the competitiveness 
of the national markets. 
DIP: It is the index Deposit Insurer Power from Barth et al. (2004 and 2008). It ranges 
from 1 to 3 with higher values indicating more power. 
4.4 The National Discretions variables 
The National Discretions variables are included in the regression and their relevance tested for 
different specifications. In particular, for the ND grouped depending on their stringency 
and risk sensitivity, we run a regression with the aggregate index and a regression for each 
one of the different areas of regulation. We could expect that more stringency, which would 
be associated with higher values for the indices, would result in lower risk and higher capital, 
as a proxy for higher solvency while negatively affecting efficiency and increasing costs. 
It could be argued that the choice by a country of more stringency or more risk 
sensitivity in regulation results from the efficiency and solvency of their banking system. 
The possibility of such inverse causation needs therefore to be addressed. 
Because of lack of a time series, we test for it with the calculation of the simple 
correlations between each one of the ND indices for risk sensitivity or stringency and 
the variables that we are analysing (risk, capital, efficiency and costs). We also carry out the 
estimation of a univariate regression where each one of the indices is explained only by each 
one of the variables, at the country level. As the results in Table 2 show, the correlations 
are very low (part A) and the coefficients are only statistically significant for the variable of 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1029 
capital in the case of stringency and the ND on scope and for the variable of efficiency 
in the case of the ND on scope if AC is used (part B).11 
 
 
ST RS OF S CRSA_ST CRSA_RS CRD_ST CRD_RS IRB_ST IRB_RS OR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
LOLPTA ‐0.029 0.274 0.192 0.139 ‐0.190 ‐0.178 0.070 0.106 ‐0.227 0.195 ‐0.029
ETA 0.368 0.302 0.166 0.474 0.232 ‐0.206 ‐0.112 ‐0.046 0.218 0.293 0.391
INEFT ‐0.123 ‐0.293 ‐0.198 ‐0.130 ‐0.075 ‐0.042 0.115 ‐0.069 0.055 ‐0.321 ‐0.037
AC ‐0.125 ‐0.002 ‐0.197 ‐0.327 0.082 0.167 0.282 0.126 0.114 0.107 ‐0.147
ST RS OF S CRSA_ST CRSA_RS CRD_ST CRD_RS IRB_ST IRB_RS OR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
LOLPTA ‐0.008 0.179 0.105 0.636 ‐0.071 ‐0.157 0.040 0.079 ‐0.104 0.135 ‐0.028
ETA 0.912* 1.780 0.822 1.959** 0.787 ‐1.632 ‐0.579 ‐0.307 0.900 1.823 3.425
INEFT ‐0.183 ‐1.043 ‐0.591 ‐0.323 ‐0.154 ‐0.200 0.358 ‐0.278 0.138 ‐1.204 ‐0.197
AC ‐1.288 ‐0.048 4.037 ‐5.597* 1.150 5.509 6.047 3.514 1.956 2.773 ‐5.328
(**) Statistically significant at 5% level of confidence, (*)Statistically significant at 10% level of confidence
DEPENDENCY BETWEEN ND VARIABLES AND BANKS' RISK, CAPITAL , EFFICIENCY AND COSTS
Table 2
(2) Coefficient β in the regression of ND= α+β*Y, where y is either banks' risk, capital, efficiency or cost averaged by country
(1) Simple correlation by country
B. Univariate regressions of ND on Banks' Risk, Capital, Efficiency and Costs (2)
A. Simple correlations (1)
 
 
We interpret both the low correlations and the lack of statistical significance as a sign 
of no causation, so that banks’ risk, capital and efficiency do not determine the level of 
stringency and risk sensitivity chosen by MS. 
We apply a filter to detect and remove outliers for the control variables (roughly 
corresponding to the 1st and 99th percentiles of the distribution of the respective variable, 
distinguishing among banks, saving and cooperatives). 
                                                                          
11. The main differences in relation to the equiponderated indices arise in relation to the OR area, where the sign differs. 
In particular, under the simple index the relation is positive with LOLPTA and INEFT. It is also the case that LOLPTA is 
statistically significant for CRSA, and RS for AC. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Aggregate results  
The information in Table 3 presents the qualitative results obtained through the estimation 
of the system of equations in [1], when we have included in the specification, both jointly and 
individually the two aggregate ND indices that distinguish between risk sensitivity (RS) 
and stringency (ST). The Table summarises whether more solvency is obtained, through either 
higher capital or lower risk or both and whether higher inefficiency or higher costs or both 
accompany more stringency and more risk sensitivity. It also reflects whether these results 
show evidence of a trade-off between solvency and efficiency. 
We find no evidence of a trade-off for overall stringency while we do for overall risk 
sensitivity. In particular, we find evidence that more stringency results in higher solvency, 
but cannot find evidence that it is also associated with higher inefficiency. On the other hand, 
overall higher risk sensitivity in capital requirements is associated with higher solvency but 
also with higher inefficiency, thus resulting in a trade-off between solvency and efficiency. 
 
 
SOLVENCY INEFFICIENCY TRADE‐OFF
Stringency Y N N
Risk Sensitivity Y Y Y
Stringency Y N N
Risk Sensitivity Y Y Y
Individual Impact
Joint Impact
Table 3
TRADE‐OFF BETWEEN SOLVENCY AND EFFICIENCY IN CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS. 
INDIVIDUAL AND JOINT RESULTS OF AGGREGATE STRINGENCY AND RISK 
 
 
Table 4 provides the more detailed qualitative results that support the relations that 
have just been summarised. In particular, Table 4 records the statistical significance and the 
sign of the coefficient for the ND indices (β coefficients in [1]) on each of the estimated 
two sets of equations; that is, the set that includes INEF as the inefficiency measure (first line 
recorded in the Table) and the one that includes AC, instead (second line). Under Risk 
we show the results obtained for the estimation of β in the risk equation (LOLPTA as the 
dependent variable); under Capital we record the results for β in the capital equation (ETA) 
and under Inefficiency the results obtained for this coefficient in the efficiency and cost 
equation (INEF and AC), respectively. The detailed quantitative results for the joint estimate 
can be found in Annex 3. 
The results show that, in general, the overall stringency and the overall risk sensitivity 
inherent in the choice of national discretions have an impact on risk, on capital and on 
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efficiency. We find that both stringency and risk sensitivity in regulation have the desired 
positive effect on solvency: the more stringent the choice of discretions is and the more their 
risk sensitivity, the lower the risk that firms show, as recorded by a negative statistically 
significant coefficient for the ND indices in the risk equation. Moreover, we also find evidence 
that more risk sensitivity is associated with higher capital, as the positive statistically 
significant coefficient in the capital equation reflects. 
 
 
RISK CAPITAL
TECH COST
‐** . .
‐** . ‐**
‐** +** +**
‐** +** .
‐** . .
‐** . ‐**
‐** +** +**
‐** +** +*
(**) Statistically significant at 5% level of confidence, (*)Statistically significant at 10% level of confidence
Stringency
Risk Sensitivity
Risk Sensitivity
Individual Impact
Joint Impact
Table 4
IMPACT OF STRINGENCY AND RISK SENSITIVITY IN CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS ON RISK, CAPITAL, 
EFFICIENCY AND COSTS
INEFFICIENCY
Stringency
 
 
As for the undesired effects on efficiency, we find that while higher inefficiency also 
results from higher risk sensitivity, higher stringency is associated with lower costs, a result 
that is be consistent with Berger’s findings. 
Therefore, more general regulatory stringency in capital requirements seems to 
result in a positive effect on financial stability as it is associated with lower risk. Moreover, 
more stringency results in lower costs, a finding that could be explained by markets’ positively 
valuing stringency and thus generating lower funding costs. 
We also find that risk sensitivity in the choice of ND for capital requirements has 
a positive impact on stability, both through its positive impact on capital and through its 
negative one on risk. But this benefit is counterbalanced by its negative impact on efficiency 
and on higher costs, so that for risk sensitivity we observe a trade-off between solvency and 
efficiency. 
5.2 Disaggregated results by areas of discretion 
The aggregate indices can be regarded as reflecting the general approach to capital 
regulation that the supervisors have. We could think that there may be some heterogeneity in 
the effects that the different areas of discretion can have on solvency and efficiency, not only 
because their incidence may be heterogeneous, but also because their impact may differ. 
It could be the case that in spite of the fact that regulators have chosen the more stringent 
option, there are but few institutions under their jurisdiction that are directly affected by the 
measure. On the other hand, areas such as own funds may have a more widespread 
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incidence, than other areas where the relationship with capital or risk may be more indirect. 
Moreover, it could be the case that the isolated effects of a specific area of capital regulation 
differ from the rest because of its interaction with other regulatory aspects. 
The analysis of the impact of each one of the different areas of national discretion 
is carried out using two approaches. Under the first one, we only include one ND index at 
a time in the specification, so that we try to capture its impact independently from the rest 
of the measures, so as to obtain the individual effect. In fact, such approach is the one 
that underlines the way policy makers usually carry out the analysis of the effects of each 
measure. In general, when a policy decision needs to be reached, it is usually the case that 
only the effects that could be expected from the specific proposal that the policymakers 
are analysing are considered, as if the decisions were taken in isolation with respect to the 
rest of the measures. In general, the task forces or working groups that are being created 
to discuss policy decisions look at each area of regulation in isolation. 
Under the second approach, we try to overcome the limitations of the isolated 
approach by jointly including in the specification to be estimated all the different areas 
of national discretion and then testing for their individual relevance. This approach allows us to 
capture the interactions that could exist among them. 
We first present the summary results obtained from the individual estimates 
in relation to the existence of a trade-off between efficiency and stability in the choice of ND 
(Table 5), before analysing the detailed individual results (Table 6) that give rise to the 
summary that is recorded in the previous Table. We finalise this section presenting this same 
results when the joint estimates are considered (Tables 7 and 8). 
5.2.1 INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS BY AREAS OF DISCRETION 
As recorded in Table 5, we find evidence that for all areas of ND, except the risk sensitivity 
component of the Counterparty Risk, the regulators’ expected positive relationship between 
solvency and stringency or risk sensitivity holds. However, we cannot unambiguously 
establish the sign of this relationship in the areas of own funds and the stringency component 
of Counterparty Risk. 
As for the effect on efficiency of having more stringency in particular areas of ND, 
we observe mixed results. In particular, we obtain that in three areas of ND (Scope, 
the stringency component of the Standard Approach and the risk component of the 
Counterparty Risk) we cannot find evidence of more inefficiency for having been chosen. 
All in all, we only find evidence of a trade-off between efficiency and solvency in the areas 
of Operational Risk, both components of IRB and the risk component of the Standard 
Approach. 
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SOLVENCY INEFFICIENCY TRADE‐OFF
Own Funds Y (?) Y (?) N
Scope Y N N
Standard Y N N
Internal Models Y Y (?) Y
Counterparty Y (?) Y N
Operational Y Y Y
Standard Y Y Y
Internal Models Y Y Y
Counterparty N N N
Specific Risk
Specific Stringency:
Table 5
TRADE‐OFF BETWEEN SOLVENCY AND EFFICIENCY IN CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS. 
INDIVIDUAL RESULTS
 
 
The detailed results in Table 6 show that in all the areas of ND where we have found 
evidence of a positive relationship between stringency and solvency, this is so by either a 
positive impact on capital (Own Funds, IRB and Counterparty Risk) and/or a negative on risk 
(Scope, Standard Approach, IRB and Operational). However, in the areas of Own Funds and 
Counterparty Risk we also obtain a positive impact on risk, under the specification that uses 
technical inefficiency, thus raising some ambiguity as far as the final relationship is concerned, 
as it will depend on the relative impact on capital and risk of stringency in these areas. As for 
the impact of having more risk sensitivity capital regulation, we find that it increases stability 
when it is channelled through the ND of both the Standard and the IRB approach, through 
its positive impact on capital (Standard and IRB) and negative on risk (IRB). However, it has 
the undesired effect of raising risk when it is channelled through the Counterparty Risk. 
The effects on efficiency are more mixed up. As for stringency, we obtain 
contradictory results for the areas of Own Funds and IRB, depending on which variable is 
chosen to capture inefficiencies: we get a positive relationship with technical inefficiency, but 
a negative one with cost. Only in the areas of the Stringency component of Counterparty 
Risk and operational Risk the evidence points clearly at a positive impact on inefficiency. 
Moreover, in the areas of Scope and the stringency component of the Standard Approach 
we cannot find a positive relationship with inefficiency: in the latter case, because there is no 
statistically significant relationship and in the area of Scope as more stringency is associated 
with lower costs. 
Finally, more risk sensitivity in the areas of the Standard Approach and the IRB 
approach result in higher inefficiency, a result that does not hold in the area of Counterparty 
Risk. 
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RISK CAPITAL
ND Index
TECH COST
Own Funds +* +** +**
∙ +** ‐**
Scope ‐** . .
‐** . ‐**
Standard ‐** . .
‐** ‐** .
Internal Models ‐** +** +**
‐** +** ‐**
Counterparty +* +** +**
+ +** +
Operational ‐** . .
‐** . +**
Standard . +** +**
. +** +**
Internal Models ‐** +** +**
‐** +** .
Counterparty . . ‐*
+** . ‐**
(**) Statistically significant at 5% level of confidence, (*)Statistically significant at 10% level of confidence
Table 6
Specific Risk
Specific Stringency:
IMPACT OF STRINGENCY AND RISK SENSITIVITY IN AREAS OF NATIONAL DISCRETION ON RISK, 
CAPITAL, EFFICIENCY AND COSTS. INDIVIDUAL RESULTS
INEFFICIENCY
 
 
5.2.2 JOINT EFFECTS BY AREAS OF DISCRETION  
The analysis carried out so far considers the effect of each one of the different areas of 
capital standards regulation in isolation, as if the other measures were not in place. It can 
provide us a guide to what we can expect if only this regulatory area is implemented. 
In order to take into account the possibility that decisions are jointly made in different areas 
and that some interaction takes place, we estimate the set of equations in (1) including 
as explanatory variables all the ND indices.12 
The comparison of the results summarised in Table 7 and detailed in Table 8 with the 
ones just presented in Tables 3 and 4 shows that as far as the areas of risk sensitivity 
are concerned, the same relationships that we have captured hold under the joint analysis. 
That is, more risk sensitivity in capital requirements results in a trade-off between solvency 
and efficiency except in the area of counterparty risk. 
On the other hand, in the ND areas that reflect stringency, the results we obtained 
when we considered the effects in isolation do not always hold when the joint analysis is 
carried out. In particular, we observe a trade-off between solvency and efficiency in the 
areas of Scope and the Standard Approach that we had not been observed when the effects 
were analysed in isolation, while we do not observe such a trade-off for IRB and Operational 
Risk. 
                                                                          
12. See Table A.4 in Appendix 3. 
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When we consider the joint effects of all ND we still obtain in most cases that 
stringency is positively associated with solvency, the exceptions being Own Funds and 
Operational Risk. On the other hand, the effects on efficiency under the joint analysis seem to 
provide different results from the ones obtained under the individual analysis. Under the joint 
approach, we find that more stringency in the areas of Scope, the Standard Approach and 
Counterparty risk are associated with higher inefficiency, a relationship we only got under 
the individual analysis for the latter. On the other hand, we do not observe such relationship 
in the areas of Own Funds, IRB and Operational Risk, when we did, under the individual 
analysis. 
 
 
SOLVENCY INEFFICIENCY TRADE‐OFF
Own Funds N N N
Scope Y Y Y
Standard Y Y Y
Internal Models Y N N
Counterparty Y (?) Y (?) N
Operational N N N
Standard Y Y Y
Internal Models Y Y Y
Counterparty N N N
Specific Risk
Specific Stringency:
Table 7
TRADE‐OFF BETWEEN SOLVENCY AND EFFICIENCY IN CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS. JOINT 
RESULTS
 
 
The more detailed results recorded in Table 8 show that we obtain that more 
stringency in Own funds and in Operational Risk does not result in higher solvency, as either 
capital is lower (Own Funds) or risk is higher (Own Funds and Operational Risk). For the rest 
of the areas, the positive relation between stringency and solvency shows through higher 
capital, when under the individual approach it was mainly showing in lower risk. In the case of 
the Standard Approach it is reinforced by its negative relation to risk. 
We also find that in the areas where stringency is the issue, there is a negative 
relationship with inefficiency only in the areas of Scope and the Standard Approach. For these 
areas be observe that higher stringency is associated with higher technical inefficiency, 
a result that we did not get under the isolated analysis. In the area of the Standard Approach 
it also shows in higher costs. There is no other area were we observe a positive relationship 
between stringency and costs, as either it is not statistically significant (Scope) or it is negative 
(Own Funds, IRB, Counterparty Risk and Operational Risk). 
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RISK CAPITAL
ND Index
TECH COST
Own Funds . ‐** ‐*
+** . ‐**
Scope . +** +**
. +** .
Standard ‐* +** +**
‐** . +**
Internal Models . +** .
. . ‐**
Counterparty +** +** +**
. +** ‐*
Operational . ‐** ‐**
. ‐** ‐**
Standard . +** .
. +** +**
Internal Models ‐** . .
‐** . +**
Counterparty . . ‐*
. . ‐**
(**) Statistically significant at 5% level of confidence, (*)Statistically significant at 10% level of confidence
Specific Risk
Specific Stringency:
Table 8
IMPACT OF STRINGENCY AND RISK SENSITIVITY IN AREAS OF NATIONAL DISCRETION ON RISK, 
CAPITAL, EFFICIENCY AND COSTS. JOINT RESULTS
INEFFICIENCY
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6 Simulation of different choices 
We use the results that we have obtained in order to quantify the effect that different choices 
of stringency and risk sensitivity in capital regulation would have implied on risk, capital and 
efficiency, under a ceteris paribus assumption. In particular, we propose analysing the impact 
on these factors of choosing for all MS the most stringent possible combination of National 
Discretions (ST_MAX), the least stringent one (ST_MIN), the most risk sensitive one (RS_MAX) 
and the least sensitive one (RS_MIN).  With the analysis that we have carried out we cannot 
estimate the impact of changing the rules chosen in each country, but we can simulate the 
implicit effect under the estimates we have obtained. 
We also present the results obtained under the option chosen by CEBS in its 
October 2008 advice (ST_CEBS). In particular, CEBS proposed to keep as an option or 
national discretion 28% of the 152 provisions covered in its analysis.13 It must be reminded 
that the choice made by CEBS implied changes only in ND that we have gathered under the 
stringency index, but it did not propose changing the treatment given to any of the discretions 
that we have grouped under the risk sensitivity index, so that the impact that we can capture 
for CEBS choice is channelled only through the effects of more or less stringency on risk, 
capital and costs. 
We present in Table 9 the quantitative results that we obtain from the estimation of 
the model that had AC as the efficiency measure and when the equiponderated indices were 
used14 (Table A5 in Appendix 3). We apply the coefficients that we have estimated to 
the difference between the observed index and the corresponding index that we would 
obtain if the choice of ND had been each one of the combinations above mentioned. 
When the coefficient is not statistically significant, we assume the effect to be nil. The values 
on the Table reflect the changes in the mean risk, capital and cost variable that each choice 
would imply in each country. 
 
                                                                          
13. In particular, following the Call for Advice CEBS classified the options and national discretions into three categories: 
i) options and discretions that might be subject to mutual recognition; ii) possible legitimate options and discretions; 
and iii) options and discretions which should be deleted. We can only take into consideration ii) and iii). On April 2009 the 
Commission requested further technical advice on several national discretions, which was delivered in June. Further 
work is expected within the next future. 
14. We cannot use the Principal Component Indices in this part as we want to estimate the differential impact. See Table 
A5 in Appendix 3. 
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ST_CEBS ST_MAX ST_MIN RS_MAX RS_MIN RS_MAX RS_MIN ST_CEBS ST_MAX ST_MIN RS_MAX RS_MIN
country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
AUSTRIA 0.067 ‐0.974 0.403 ‐0.926 0.618 0.474 ‐0.316 0.018 ‐0.260 0.108 0.508 ‐0.339
BELGIUM ‐1.753 ‐54.349 17.532 ‐24.173 56.404 0.309 ‐0.721 ‐0.008 ‐0.245 0.079 0.224 ‐0.523
BULGARIA ‐0.160 ‐0.441 1.203 ‐0.921 0.921 0.370 ‐0.370 ‐0.039 ‐0.107 0.291 0.458 ‐0.458
CYPRUS 0.000 ‐0.517 0.298 ‐0.457 0.457 0.513 ‐0.513 0.000 ‐0.159 0.092 0.290 ‐0.290
CZECH REP 0.000 ‐0.690 0.596 ‐0.720 0.720 0.350 ‐0.350 0.000 ‐0.250 0.215 0.535 ‐0.535
DENMARK ‐4.153 ‐17.649 24.916 ‐19.086 28.629 0.230 ‐0.344 ‐0.036 ‐0.153 0.215 0.339 ‐0.509
ESTONIA ‐0.008 ‐0.181 0.128 ‐0.173 0.173 0.248 ‐0.248 ‐0.007 ‐0.162 0.115 0.319 ‐0.319
FINLAND ‐0.842 ‐25.259 9.262 ‐19.349 19.349 0.616 ‐0.616 ‐0.009 ‐0.271 0.099 0.427 ‐0.427
FRANCE 0.000 ‐1.396 0.578 ‐1.106 1.106 0.292 ‐0.292 0.000 ‐0.229 0.095 0.372 ‐0.372
GERMANY 0.029 ‐0.831 0.344 ‐0.922 0.395 0.751 ‐0.322 0.009 ‐0.251 0.104 0.573 ‐0.246
GREECE 0.069 ‐1.270 0.137 ‐0.631 0.947 0.383 ‐0.575 0.019 ‐0.354 0.038 0.361 ‐0.541
HUNGARY 0.022 ‐0.657 0.241 ‐0.402 0.604 0.181 ‐0.272 0.005 ‐0.138 0.051 0.174 ‐0.261
IRELAND ‐0.295 ‐6.487 5.603 ‐4.066 9.487 0.162 ‐0.378 ‐0.007 ‐0.154 0.133 0.198 ‐0.463
ITALY 0.000 ‐0.907 0.710 ‐0.906 0.906 0.330 ‐0.330 0.000 ‐0.224 0.175 0.459 ‐0.459
LATVIA 0.000 ‐2.446 1.411 ‐2.594 1.729 0.294 ‐0.196 0.000 ‐0.209 0.120 0.455 ‐0.303
LITHUANIA ‐0.131 ‐0.656 1.137 ‐1.206 0.804 0.464 ‐0.310 ‐0.027 ‐0.133 0.230 0.501 ‐0.334
LUXEMBOURG 0.036 ‐1.289 0.179 ‐0.659 0.988 0.497 ‐0.746 0.007 ‐0.255 0.035 0.267 ‐0.401
MALTA 0.000 ‐3.973 2.543 ‐4.382 2.921 0.449 ‐0.299 0.000 ‐0.259 0.166 0.588 ‐0.392
NETHERLANDS 0.000 ‐7.327 4.227 ‐3.885 9.066 0.235 ‐0.549 0.000 ‐0.018 0.010 0.019 ‐0.045
POLAND ‐0.733 ‐2.199 5.313 ‐3.368 5.053 0.289 ‐0.434 ‐0.030 ‐0.090 0.216 0.282 ‐0.423
PORTUGAL 0.000 ‐0.809 0.518 ‐1.041 0.446 0.552 ‐0.236 0.000 ‐0.213 0.136 0.563 ‐0.241
ROMANIA 0.017 ‐0.445 0.257 ‐0.394 0.394 0.363 ‐0.363 0.006 ‐0.143 0.083 0.260 ‐0.260
SLOVAKIA ‐0.024 ‐0.359 0.622 ‐0.330 0.770 0.182 ‐0.426 ‐0.010 ‐0.149 0.259 0.282 ‐0.658
SLOVENIA ‐0.024 ‐0.537 0.464 ‐0.449 0.673 0.295 ‐0.442 ‐0.011 ‐0.232 0.200 0.398 ‐0.597
SPAIN 0.033 ‐1.038 0.335 ‐0.770 0.770 0.506 ‐0.506 0.012 ‐0.367 0.118 0.558 ‐0.558
SWEDEN ‐0.242 ‐2.666 2.302 ‐2.784 2.784 0.260 ‐0.260 ‐0.021 ‐0.235 0.203 0.505 ‐0.505
UNITED KING 0.000 ‐0.938 0.303 ‐0.417 0.974 0.220 ‐0.513 0.000 ‐0.180 0.058 0.165 ‐0.385
(1) obtained from the results of the estimation presented in col. 1 in Tables A3 to A5. Under CEBS, MAX_ST, MIN_ST it is recorded the change in the variables under the CEBS, the maximum and minimum
 stringency option, respectively. Under MAX_RS and MIN_RS it is recorded the change in the variables under the maximum and minimum risk sensitivity option, respectively.
TABLE 9
RISK CAPITAL COSTS
 SIMULATION OF IMPACT ON AVERAGE RISK , CAPITAL AND COSTS OF DIFFERENT PROPOSALS ON THE LEVEL OF STRINGENCY AND RIST SENSITIVITY  BY COUNTRY  (1)
 
 
The results presented in Table 9 show that the CEBS option does have rather 
large effects on the risk ratio in most countries [col. (1)], especially if we compare them with 
the effects on average costs [col. (8)]. We might get both rises and declines in risk depending 
on whether the country reduces its stringency under the option proposed by CEBS (a rise in 
risk) or increases it (a decline in risk). In fact, the largest impacts are obtained in reductions 
in risk, implying that CEBS proposal implies larger movements towards more stringency, 
rather than making countries less stringent. From our calculations, the risk ratio could 
increase at most 6% in some countries while the reductions could reach as far as nearly 5 
times the initial ratio. On the other hand, from our calculations the impact of CEBS proposal 
on costs also shows both signs [col. (8)], which depend on the country. It is the case that if 
the adoption of the CEBS proposal implies an increase in stringency in a given country, 
we can expect to see reductions in costs. By the same token, for those countries where 
stringency will be reduced, we can expect to observe increases in cost. Our estimates show 
that we can expect increases of at most 1% and declines of at most 2% on average costs, 
resulting from CEBS option.15 Finally, because of lack of statistical significance of the 
coefficient, we assume that we cannot observe any effect on capital. 
The choice of maximum (minimum) stringency would result in much higher effects 
on the average country risk and costs in absolute terms than the ones we would obtain 
under the CEBS option, but they would always have the same negative (positive) sign in all 
countries. 
In absolute terms, moving towards maximum stringency would result in higher 
changes in risk than moving towards minimum stringency in most countries, the exceptions 
being Bulgaria, Denmark, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. The contrary would be the case 
when comparing maximum and minimum risk sensitivity, as the move towards the minimum 
would imply the largest changes in most countries, with the exceptions of Austria, Germany 
and Poland. We also find that changing to maximum stringency has in absolute values higher 
impact than changing towards minimum risk sensitivity in most countries. 
                                                                          
15. We need to establish the equivalence between a unit of risk over total assets and one unit of costs over total assets 
in order to determine whether CEBS option, or any policy option produces a net benefit. 
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The effects in absolute values on the capital ratio of choosing a maximum risk 
sensitivity capital framework are lower than the ones we would obtain from moving towards 
a minimum risk sensitivity regulation in terms of ND. That is, in most countries, the choice of 
the least risk sensitive combination of ND would result in declines in capital that would 
be much larger than the corresponding increases that would be produced if the choice of 
maximum risk sensitivity would be taken. 
Finally, the increase in costs resulting from the minimum stringency option 
would be in absolute values lower than the decline in average costs as a result of a 
maximum stringency choice in most countries. As with risk, the contrary would happen 
when the choice is made between maximum and minimum risk sensitivity, as in this case, 
the decline in costs from choosing minimum risk sensitivity would be larger than the increase 
if the contrary option were chosen. 
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7 Summary and conclusions 
This paper carries out an empirical analysis of the effects on financial institutions of the choice 
of more or less stringency and more or less risk sensitivity in capital requirements, using the 
so-called national discretions and options (ND) that figure out in the Capital Requirements 
Directive. In particular, after controlling for individual firm characteristics, and country specific 
aspects, we test for systematic impact of different groups of National Discretions on the risk, 
capital, efficiency and costs of banks using individual data for financial institutions 
operating in 2007 in the 27 European Union countries, by means of the estimation by 
SURE of a system of equations. To do so, we have built for each country, different indices 
that group together the ND, and whose value is positively associated with stringency or 
risk sensitivity. The first group is composed of two aggregate indices that reflect either the 
stringency or the risk sensitivity in the choice of discretions, and which are assumed to reflect 
overall stringency and overall risk sensitivity in capital regulation. The second group is 
composed of nine indices that group together discretions that deal with a specific area of 
capital requirements regulation and whose value is also positively associated with stringency 
or risk sensitivity. Such disaggregation allows us to test whether different areas of regulation 
have different impact on financial institutions. 
Our results show that more stringency and more risk sensitivity in capital 
requirements usually have the desired impact on solvency. That is, in general, more 
stringency or more risk sensitivity in regulation results in financial institutions having either 
lower risk and /or higher capital. Such relationship is obtained both when the overall 
stringency and risk sensitivity and the specific areas of the regulatory capital framework 
are considered. However, in the case of ND dealing with Own Funds and Counterparty Risk, 
we also find evidence that more stringency could be associated with more risk taking, as well. 
The fact that we cannot take into account the quality of capital may be one of the factors 
explaining this result. 
We also found that, in general there is no trade off between stringency and 
efficiency. The areas of Operational Risk and IRB may be the exception, when taken in 
isolation, while the areas of Scope and the Standard Approach show that relationship 
when the effects of all the ND are jointly analysed. In all these cases we gathered evidence 
of a positive relationship with inefficiency. The ambiguity as regards the effect on solvency in 
the areas of Own Funds and Counterparty Risk does not allow us to conclude that for these 
areas there is a trade-off. 
In the case of more risk sensitivity in capital standards we find evidence of a 
trade-off, so that by choosing more risk sensitivity ND we can expect higher solvency, 
but also higher inefficiencies and/or costs. The exception is again in the area of Counterparty 
Risk where we not only could not find a positive impact on solvency, but also found a positive 
impact on efficiency. 
This study also provides empirical evidence of the limitations inherent in an 
isolated analysis of the impact of different measures, which are, in fact, jointly adopted. 
While in the areas of risk sensitivity the overall effects under the joint consideration do not 
differ from the ones obtained under the individual approach, different results are obtained 
in some of the areas of stringency. In particular, we obtain the same positive impact on 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 31 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1029 
solvency through higher capital or lower risk in all areas of ND except in Own Funds and 
Operational Risk. In the case of Own Funds, we already observed higher risk under 
the individual approach, but not for Operational Risk. The effects on efficiency are the ones 
that vary most between the two approaches. While we observed a trade-off in IRB and 
Operational Risk under the individual approach, under the joint consideration the trade-off 
is captured for the areas of Scope and the Standard Approach. 
From the estimated coefficients, we have computed the expected effects of different 
levels of stringency and risk sensitivity in capital requirements that could be channelled 
through the choice of National Discretions. Our results show that in absolute terms, 
moving towards maximum stringency would result in higher changes in risk than moving 
towards minimum stringency in most countries, while the contrary would be the case when 
comparing maximum and minimum risk sensitivity, as the move towards the minimum 
would imply the largest changes in most countries. The effects in absolute values on the 
capital ratio or on the cost ratio of choosing highest risk sensitivity are lower than the ones 
we would obtain from moving towards a minimum risk sensitivity regulation in terms of ND. 
Finally, the increase in costs resulting from the minimum stringency option would be lower 
in absolute values in most countries than the decline in average costs as a result of a 
maximum stringency choice. 
These results have some relevant policy implications. On the one hand, we can 
conclude that even small variations in capital standards policy, such as the ones embedded in 
ND, have effects on firms. However, whenever a measure is taken jointly with other measures, 
the whole package needs to be taken into consideration when analysing the effects. While 
individual considerations may show the desired effects, when they are jointly taken, they may 
generate counterbalancing reactions that may result in no benefits or excessively high costs. 
In particular, we found that more stringency in the areas of Own Funds and Counterparty Risk 
may have the undesired effects of raising risk and reducing capital (OF). Finally, there is 
always a need to consider the trade-off between efficiency and solvency that we have shown 
that may arise whenever risk sensitivity is increased in the regulatory framework or when we 
increase stringency in specific areas of the capital requirements. 
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ANNEX 1.  Description of national discretion indices 
We present in this Annex a description of what each individual and National Discretion group 
involves. Those individual ND that are preceded by (*) have been included as a component 
of the aggregate risk sensitivity index. We also state whether we consider that the adoption of 
the ND by the MS implies more stringency/more risk sensitivity (Y=1) or less stringency/less 
risk sensitivity (Y=0). We assign a value of 1 if the choice made by the MS implies either more 
stringency or more risk sensitivity. 
OF: Own funds  
Our own funds index is formed, mainly, with discretions that allow flexibility to Member States 
(MS) in the inclusion of items to be counted or deducted from own funds. Increasing 
the number of items that can be considered as own funds allows for larger values in the 
numerator of the solvency ratio, and thus in the solvency ratio of the regulated entity as well. 
Higher values imply higher stringency (less items allowed to be counted as or more items 
to be deducted from own funds).  In particular, the discretions are defined as: 
a) MS may permit the inclusion of interim profits before a formal decision has been taken 
on the accounts, subject to conditions (Y=0). 
b) Shares in another credit institution, financial institution, insurance or reinsurance 
undertaking may not be deducted if held temporarily for the purposes of a financial 
assistance operation designed to reorganise and save the entity (Y=0). 
c) As an alternative to deductions of participations and capital instruments held in other 
financial institutions, credit institutions may be allowed to apply, with the necessary 
changes, any of the methodologies set out in Annex 1 to the Conglomerates Directive 
(Y=0). 
d) For the purposes of the calculation of their stand alone requirements, institutions may 
not be required to deduct holdings and participations in institutions included in the scope 
of their consolidation (Y=0). 
S: Scope of application 
The scope of application index groups together those discretions that allow for a reduction 
in the regulatory burden on banking groups, by partially waiving the prudential requirements 
on a solo basis. It also includes a couple of discretions dealing with the limits to holdings in 
insurance companies (activities restrictions). In particular: 
a) MS may grant individual institutions which are subsidiaries within a group, subject to 
the fulfilment of certain conditions, an exemption from individual requirements. The same 
applies where the parent company is a financial holding company. (Y=0). 
b) MS may grant individual institutions which are the parent company within a group, subject 
to the fulfilment of certain conditions, an exemption from individual requirements. (Y=0).  
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c) MS may allow, on a case-by-case basis, for the purpose of the calculation of the 
individual requirements of the parent institution, and subject to certain conditions, 
the incorporation of subsidiaries whose material exposures or liabilities are to that parent 
credit institution (Y=0). 
d) The Competent Authorities (CA) may decide to exempt, fully or partially, a credit institution 
from Pillar III requirements provided such institution is included within a group complying 
with comparable disclosures on a consolidated basis in a third country. (Y=0). 
e) MS may decide that, if certain conditions are met, some subsidiaries need not be included 
in consolidation. (Y=0). 
f) MS may exempt insurance sector undertakings from the general limits established for 
qualifying holdings. (Y=0). 
g) MS may decide not to apply limits on qualifying holdings, provided excess is deducted 
from own funds. (Y=0). 
CRSA: Credit risk Standard Approach  
The credit risk standard approach index contains discretions affecting the computation 
of capital requirements for credit risk for those entities following the Standard Approach. 
The index mainly contains discretions affecting the risk weights of certain exposures and the 
items defining the range of collateral allowed by each Member State. A lower risk weight 
or more items accepted as collateral, reduces the denominator of the solvency ratio, thus 
increasing the solvency ratio of the regulated entity.   
a) (*) MS may choose between two alternative methods for risk-weighting exposures 
to credit institutions: (a) on the basis of the risk-weight of the corresponding central 
government and (b) on the basis of the credit assessment of the institution itself ( if option 
b) is chosen Y=1) 
b) If certain conditions are met, the CA may assign a 0% risk-weight on exposures not 
forming part of "own funds" of a credit institution to its parent undertaking, its subsidiary, 
a subsidiary of its parent undertaking or an undertaking linked by a relationship within the 
meaning of Article 12(1) of Directive 83/349/EEC, provided that the following conditions 
on article 80.7 of the CRD are met. (Y=0). 
c) If certain conditions are met, the CA may assign a 0% risk weight on exposures not 
forming part of "own funds" to counterparties which are members of the same institutional 
protection scheme as the lending institution. (Y=0). 
d) (*) In order to use unsolicited ratings, credit institutions must get permission from the CA. 
To make this possible, that alternative should be incorporated to legislation (implicit 
discretion). (Y=1). 
e) A CA may allow short term exposures to MS' institutions denominated and funded 
in the national currency a risk weight that is one category less favourable than the 
preferential risk weight applicable on exposures to EU central governments. (Y=0). 
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f) Where an exposure to an institution is in the form of minimum reserves required by 
the ECB or by the central bank of a Member State to be held by a credit institution, 
Member States may permit the assignment of the risk weight that would be assigned 
to exposures to the central bank of the Member State in question provided that certain 
conditions are met. (Y=0). 
g) A risk weight of 100% may be assigned on past due exposures which are fully secured 
by non eligible collateral when value adjustments reach 15% of the exposure gross of the 
value adjustments, if strict operational criteria exist to ensure the good quality of collateral. 
(Y=0). 
h) The applicable risk weight on past due exposures secured by mortgages on residential 
property net of value adjustments may be reduced to 50%, if value adjustments are no 
less than 20% of the exposure amount gross of the value adjustments. (Y=0). 
i) The CA have the discretion to assign a risk weight of 150% on exposures associated 
with particularly high risks. (Y=1). 
j) The risk weight on non past due exposures receiving a 150% risk weight may be reduced 
to (a) 100% if value adjustments exist which are no less than 20% of the gross exposure 
and (b) 50% if value adjustments are no less than 50% of the gross exposure. (Y=0). 
k) The CA may recognise loans secured by commercial real estate as eligible collateral 
for covered bonds where the required loan to value ratio of 60% is exceeded up to a 
maximum level of 70%, if certain defined criteria and conditions are met. (Y=0). 
l) MS may allow a risk weight of 10% for exposures to institutions specialising in the 
interbank and public debt markets in their home MS, if such institutions are subject to 
close supervision and the exposures are adequately secured. (Y=0). 
m) The CA may allow the domestic currency rating of an obligor to be used for its foreign 
currency exposures provided such exposures arise from institutions' participation in a 
loan extended by a Multilateral Development Bank whose preferred creditor status 
is recognised in the market. (Y=0). 
n) The CA may recognise as eligible collateral physical items of a type other than real estate 
collateral, if satisfied as to certain conditions. (Y=0). 
o) Credit institutions must take all steps necessary to fulfil local requirements in respect of 
the enforceability of security interest. There shall be a framework which allows the lender 
to have a first priority claim over the collateral subject to national discretion to allow such 
claims to be subject to the claims of preferential creditors provided for in legislative or 
implementing provisions (Y=0). 
p) (*) When debt securities have a credit assessment from a recognised ECAI equivalent 
to investment grade or better, the CA may allow credit institutions to calculate a volatility 
estimate for each category of security. (Y=0).  
q) The CA may apply reduced risk weights to exposures or portions of exposures 
guaranteed by the central government or central bank, where the guarantee is 
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denominated in the domestic currency of the borrower and the exposure is funded 
in (Y=0). 
r) In the case of securitisations subject to an early amortization provision of retail exposures 
which are uncommitted and unconditionally cancellable without prior notice and where 
the early amortization is triggered by a quantitative value in respect of something 
other than the three months average excess spread, the competent authorities may apply 
a treatment that simplifies computations for determining the conversion figure indicated. 
(Y=0). 
CRB: Credit risk IRB 
The discretions affecting the computation of capital requirements for those entities 
following the IRB approach can be divided into two categories. First, there are discretions that 
allow the national regulator to be more or less stringent in terms of capital requirements 
(IRB_ST), just as in the Standard Approach case discussed above. Second, there are other 
discretions that allow for more or less risk sensitivity when computing capital requirements 
(IRB_RS). In particular:  
a) When IRB approach is used by an EU parent or financial holding company and its 
subsidiaries, MS may allow the minimum requirements to qualify for IRB to be met 
by parent and subsidiaries considered together. (Y=0). 
b) The CA may authorise a credit institution to generally assign a 50% risk weight to 
SL-Category 1 and 70% to SL-Category 2 (regardless of maturity) if certain conditions 
are met. (Y=0). 
c) The requirement that retail revolving exposures be unsecured [Annex VII, Part 1, 
Para. 13 b)] may be waived by the CA in respect of collateralised credit facilities linked 
to a wage account. (Y=0). 
d) Exposures to ancillary banking services undertakings (equity) can be treated as non-credit 
obligation assets. (Y=0). 
e) For the purposes of the recognition of unfunded credit protection in PD by institutions, 
the CA may extend the list of unfunded credit protection providers further than those 
included in Annex VIII, Part 1, Para. 26. (Y=0). 
f) (*) The CA may require all institutions in their jurisdiction to use maturity (M) for each 
exposure in accordance with formulae instead of using values by default (0.5 years for 
repos and 2.5 for other exposures). (Y=1). 
g) (*) The CA may allow maturity of exposures to European corporates with consolidated 
assets of less than EUR 500 million to be set at values by default, even if they apply the 
formulae option. (Y=0). 
h) (*) The CA may allow maturity of exposures to European corporates that invest primarily 
in real estate with consolidated assets of less than EUR 1,000 million to be set at values 
by default, even if they apply the formulae option. (Y=0). 
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i) For the purposes of the calculation of dilution risk, the CA may extend the list of unfunded 
credit protection providers further than those included in Annex VIII, Part 1, Para. 26. 
(Y=0). 
j) The CA may apply less stringency as regards the data needed for estimation and 
collected before the implementation of the directive, provided the credit institution makes 
appropriate adjustments. (Y=0). 
k) The CA may authorise their credit institutions to recognise as eligible collateral shares 
in Finnish housing companies that are operating in accordance with the Finnish Housing 
Company Act of 1991 provided that certain conditions are met. (Y=0). 
l) The CA may recognise as eligible collateral amounts receivable linked to a commercial 
transaction or transactions with an original maturity of less than or equal to one year. 
Eligible receivables do not include those associated with securitisations, sub-participations 
or credit derivatives or amounts owed by affiliated parties. (Y=0). 
m) The CA may recognise as eligible collateral physical items of a type other than real estate 
collateral, if satisfied as to the following: (a) liquid markets for disposal of the collateral 
do exist in an expeditious and economically efficient manner, and (b) well-established, 
publicly available market prices for the collateral do exist. The institution must be able 
to demonstrate that there is no evidence that the net prices it receives when collateral is 
realised deviates significantly from these market prices. (Y=0). 
n) The CA may recognise as eligible collateral physical items of a type other than real estate 
collateral, if satisfied as to certain conditions. (Y=0). 
o) Credit institutions must take all steps necessary to fulfil local requirements in respect 
of the enforceability of security interest. There shall be a framework which allows the 
lender to have a first priority claim over the collateral subject to national discretion to allow 
such claims to be subject to the claims of preferential creditors provided for in legislative 
or implementing provisions. (Y=0).  
p) (*) The CA may allow credit institutions to use empirical correlations within risk categories 
and across risk categories if they are satisfied that the credit institution’s system for 
measuring correlations is sound and implemented with integrity. (Y=1). 
q) (*) When debt securities have a credit assessment from a recognised ECAI equivalent 
to investment grade or better, the CA may allow credit institutions to calculate a volatility 
estimate for each category of security. (Y=0). 
r) (*) The CA may permit credit institutions to apply for securitisations involving 
retail exposures the Supervisory Formula Method using simplifications for certain risk 
parameters. (Y=0). 
CRD: Counterparty risk 
The discretions that are grouped under this heading refer to the calculations of the exposure 
value of certain contracts, that either imply more risk sensitivity or more stringency. 
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a) For institutions complying with certain requirements in their trading activities in 
commodities, gold and other products, MS may allow percentages for the calculation 
of potential future value other than the general ones. (Y=0). 
b) MS may set a value for coefficient Alpha (multiplier to calculate the exposure value 
of certain contracts) higher than 1.4. (Y=1). 
c) (*) MS may allow institutions to calculate Alpha (multiplier to calculate the exposure 
value of certain contracts) internally, subject to a floor of 1.2. (Y=1). 
OR: Operational Risk 
These discretions cover mainly the approaches that firms may use to calculate their 
operational risk, or the indicator that they may use for the determination of capital 
requirements for this risk. 
a) The CA may allow institutions to use a combination of approaches. (Y=0). 
b) The CA may under certain conditions authorise institutions to use an alternative indicator 
to calculate its capital requirements. (Y=0). 
c) The CA may allow the qualifying criteria set out to be met by the parent and its 
subsidiaries considered together. (Y=0). 
 
RS ST OF S CRSA_ST CRSA_RS IRB_ST IRB_RS CRD_ST CRD_RS OR
AUSTRIA 4 12 0 4 4 2 3 1 1 1 0
BELGIUM 8 7 0 1 7 2 0 4 2 1 0
BULGARIA 5 21 3 6 11 2 9 3 1 0 1
CYPRUS 6 11 1 2 5 1 4 4 2 0 1
CZECH REPUBLIC 6 14 2 6 6 2 3 2 2 1 0
DENMARK 6 20 0 6 10 2 4 3 2 1 2
ESTONIA 6 9 1 4 6 0 3 4 2 1 1
FINLAND 6 6 1 2 5 1 1 3 2 1 0
FRANCE 6 10 0 1 5 1 4 3 1 1 1
GERMANY 3 11 0 0 7 2 3 0 2 1 0
GREECE 7 0 0 0 3 2 0 3 1 1 0
HUNGARY 6 10 2 4 2 2 2 3 1 1 0
IRELAND 8 13 0 3 9 2 5 4 1 1 1
ITALY 6 16 1 5 4 1 6 3 1 1 1
LATVIA 5 9 0 3 7 1 4 3 1 0 0
LITHUANIA 5 19 2 4 11 1 7 3 1 0 1
LUXEMBOURG 7 5 0 1 4 1 1 4 0 1 0
MALTA 5 12 1 4 7 2 3 2 1 0 0
NETHERLANDS 8 10 0 1 8 2 5 4 1 1 0
POLAND 6 24 3 4 12 3 9 3 1 0 1
PORTUGAL 4 13 1 3 7 1 3 1 1 1 1
ROMANIA 6 9 3 4 4 2 3 2 1 1 0
SLOVAKIA 7 22 4 6 8 3 7 4 1 0 1
SLOVENIA 7 15 2 3 8 3 3 3 2 1 1
SPAIN 6 6 1 1 3 1 5 3 1 1 0
SWEDEN 6 16 2 3 10 1 4 3 1 1 0
UNITED KINGDOM 8 5 1 1 5 2 2 4 1 1 0
TOTAL 10 41 4 7 14 4 12 6 2 1 3
Source: Own calculations from CEBS.
Table A1: National Discretion Indices
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ANNEX 2.  Estimation of bank inefficiency 
We follow most recent studies that derive bank’s cost inefficiency from stochastic cost frontier 
estimates. 
For the definition and measurement of output we follow the intermediation approach 
as in Maudos et al. (2002), considering balance-sheet items as good indicators of output. 
The following three outputs are used from Bankscope profit and loss account data: 
Q1 = loans 
Q2 = other earning assets 
Q3 = deposits and other short term funding 
The prices of productive factors are proxied by: 
P1 = Cost of loanable funds, computed by dividing financial costs (interest paid) by their 
corresponding liabilities (deposit, money market funding and other funding). 
P2 = Cost of labour. It is proxied by overhead costs over total assets. 
P3 = Cost of physical capital, obtained as the ratio of other non-interest expenses, which 
proxies expenditure on plant and equipment over average assets. 
We estimate a translog frontier cost function by types of firms, distinguishing among 
commercial, saving and cooperatives and include country dummy variables except for the 
specification corresponding to commercial banks. 
In particular, the specification we estimate is the following: 
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Where ln records natural logarithm and TC is total costs, proxied as the sum of 
overhead costs + interest expense. The restrictions of symmetry and linear homogeneity have 
been imposed on input prices. 
We assume an exponential distribution to model the efficiency variable u.16 The 
characteristics of such distribution are that the probability is highest near the zero values of u 
                                                                          
16. The density function of an exponential distribution variable ui is 
f(ui) = 1/η exp (- ui/η),                   ui >=0 
where the mean and the standard deviation of ui are both equal to η >0. 
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which means that the probability of firms being close to full efficiency is the highest. 
It is appropriate for a competitive market such as the banking system in Europe. If firms 
are homogeneous it is expected that there will be fewer firms that are highly inefficient. On the 
other hand, if firms are heterogeneous, one might find some firms that are highly inefficient 
thereby meaning that the tail of the distribution is long. It would be indicated by a large value 
for the variance parameter. The results are presented in Table A.2. 
 
 
COMMERCIAL BANKS SAVING BANKS (1) COOPERATIVES (1)
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
lq1 0.384 0.020 0.269 0.027 0.313 0.010
lq2 0.438 0.027 0.138 0.021 0.279 0.007
lq3 0.170 0.037 0.612 0.049 0.411 0.013
lnp1 0.687 0.025 0.659 0.015 0.621 0.009
lnp3 0.017 0.015 0.019 0.007 0.019 0.002
c_lnp1_p1 0.129 0.010 0.205 0.008 0.187 0.007
c_lnp3_p1 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.004 ‐0.011 0.004
c_lq1_p1 0.062 0.021 0.262 0.016 0.184 0.009
c_lq2_p1 0.016 0.023 0.136 0.009 0.087 0.007
c_lq3_p1 ‐0.115 0.035 ‐0.400 0.023 ‐0.283 0.014
c_lnp3_p3 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.001
c_lq1_p3 0.014 0.007 ‐0.012 0.006 ‐0.015 0.004
c_lq2_p3 0.016 0.008 ‐0.010 0.004 0.009 0.003
c_lq3_p3 ‐0.022 0.013 0.024 0.009 0.006 0.005
c_lq1_q1 0.049 0.004 0.161 0.010 0.142 0.006
c_lq2_q1 ‐0.174 0.017 ‐0.136 0.019 ‐0.132 0.009
c_lq3_q1 0.035 0.018 ‐0.181 0.041 ‐0.165 0.017
c_lq2_q2 0.036 0.004 0.052 0.006 0.088 0.002
c_lq3_q2 0.041 0.019 0.043 0.032 ‐0.048 0.011
c_lq3_q3 0.013 0.016 0.059 0.038 0.113 0.013
Observations 370 450 1698
TABLE A.2 ESTIMATION OF STOCHASTIC COST FUNCTION
(1) Includes country dummies  
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ANNEX 3 
 
LOLPTA ETA INEFT LOLPTA ETA AC
ETA ‐0.009** ‐0.178** 0.002 ‐0.070**
INEFT ‐0.049** ‐1.067**
AC 0.023** 0.031
LOLPTA ‐1.084** ‐1.359** 0.796** 0.237**
TNLTA ‐0.004** ‐0.113** ‐0.023** ‐0.003* ‐0.108** ‐0.021**
SIZE 0.065** ‐0.721** 0.212** 0.047** ‐1.435** ‐0.065
SIZE2 ‐0.005** ‐0.026 ‐0.036** ‐0.003** 0.032* ‐0.004
LIQUID ‐0.002** ‐0.035** ‐0.020** 0.002** 0.142** ‐0.010**
OFFBARL 0.008** 0.072** ‐0.022** 0.012** 0.127** 0.003
FEES ‐0.009* ‐0.384** ‐0.013* 0.768**
ROAA 2.266** 3.277**
COIRC 0.000 0.045* ‐0.003 0.001 0.049* ‐0.009
OEPOAC 0.122** ‐0.475 ‐0.543** 0.202** 0.655* ‐0.144
GDP 0.026** ‐0.438** ‐0.198** 0.036** ‐0.414** ‐0.041
HERFINDAHL ‐0.156** 0.038 ‐0.753** ‐0.136** 1.283** 0.529**
DEPOSIT ‐0.014 0.717** 0.350** ‐0.023 0.689** ‐0.022
RS ‐0.099** 3.712** 0.799** ‐0.140** 3.275** 0.234*
ST ‐0.076** ‐0.343 ‐0.146 ‐0.077** ‐0.295 ‐0.200**
_CONS 1.894** 52.167** 41.210** ‐0.364** 10.585** 6.351**
Observations 2089 2089 2089 2108 2108 2108
R‐2 0.138 0.477 0.374 0.164 0.446 0.613
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%
Table A.3 Estimation of Risk, Capital and Efficiency Equations with aggregated ND indices
1. ineft as the efficiency variable 2. ac as the efficiency variable
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LOLPTA ETA INEFT LOLPTA ETA AC
ETA ‐0.009** ‐0.190** 0.002 ‐0.062**
INEFT ‐0.050** ‐1.105**
AC 0.037** 0.107*
LOLPTA ‐1.369** 0.758** 0.345**
TNLTA ‐0.004** ‐0.096** ‐0.021** ‐0.003 ‐0.087** ‐0.019**
SIZE 0.032** ‐0.606** 0.225** 0.042** ‐1.326** ‐0.036
SIZE2 ‐0.005** ‐0.030* ‐0.036** ‐0.002* 0.029 ‐0.006
LIQUID ‐0.002** ‐0.029** ‐0.019** 0.002** 0.019** ‐0.012**
OFFBARL 0.008** 0.081** ‐0.019** 0.013** 0.138** ‐0.003
FEES ‐0.008 ‐0.371** ‐0.022** 0.751**
COIRC 0.003 0.114** ‐0.000 0.005 0.166** ‐0.011
OEPOAC 0.030 ‐1.473* ‐0.383 ‐0.022 ‐1.378 1.636**
GDP 0.026 0.324 ‐0.075 0.048** 0.421 ‐0.316**
HERFINDAHL ‐0.102 ‐1.837** ‐1.248** 0.014 ‐0.458 ‐1.129**
ROAA 2.112** 3.151**
DEPOSITS 0.040 0.647* 0.428** 0.027 0.473 ‐0.008
OF 0.082 ‐2.793** ‐1.023** 0.203** ‐1.821 ‐1.507**
S 0.036 2.648** 0.763** 0.002 2.348** 0.161
CRSA_ST ‐0.074* 1.194** 0.479** ‐0.141** 0.586 0.541**
CRD_ST 0.169** 4.140** 1.715** 0.106 2.385** ‐0.398*
IRB_ST ‐0.005 1.715** 0.451 0.059 1.431 ‐1.718**
OR ‐0.083 ‐4.723** ‐1.579** ‐0.003 ‐4.040** ‐0.720**
CRSA_RS ‐0.045 2.336** 0.322 ‐0.091 2.648** 1.094**
CRD_RS ‐0.109 ‐1.542 ‐1.041* 0.001 ‐0.387 ‐1.403**
IRB_RS ‐0.227** 0.334 ‐0.329 ‐0.299** 1.160 1.983**
_CONS 2.037** 44.708** 40.385 ‐0.391 ‐1.201 6.854**
Observations 2089 2089 2089 2108 2108 2108
R‐2 0.145 0.493 0.378 0.171 0.464 0.647
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%
Table A.4 Estimation of Risk, Capital and Efficiency Equations with all areas of ND
ineft as the efficiency variable ac as the efficiency variable
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LOLPTA ETA INEFT LOLPTA ETA AC
ETA ‐0.009** ‐0.171** 0.002 ‐0.072**
INEFT ‐0.050** ‐1.049**
AC 0.029** 0.002
LOLPTA ‐1.101** ‐1.389** 0.834** 0.289**
TNLTA ‐0.004** ‐0.102** ‐0.020** ‐0.003* ‐0.097** ‐0.018**
SIZE 0.058** ‐0.735** 0.200* 0.040* ‐1.411** ‐0.037
SIZE2 ‐0.005** ‐0.021 ‐0.033** ‐0.002 0.032* ‐0.007
LIQUID ‐0.002** ‐0.034** ‐0.020** 0.002** 0.014** ‐0.010**
OFFBARL 0.008** 0.074** ‐0.023** 0.012** 0.128** 0.004
FEES ‐0.008* ‐0.383** ‐0.017** 0.764**
ROAA 2.402** 3.396**
COIRC 0.000 ‐0.019 ‐0.029** 0.001 0.015 0.018**
OEPOAC 0.120** 0.354 ‐0.289** 0.196** 1.273** ‐0.257**
GDP 0.016 ‐0.701** ‐0.318** 0.027** ‐0.544** 0.086**
HERFINDAHL ‐0.189** ‐0.062 ‐0.712** ‐0.165** 1.103* 0.145
DEPOSIT ‐0.018 0.934** 0.444** ‐0.030 0.722** ‐0.196**
RS ‐0.047** 0.525** ‐0.054 ‐0.058** 0.777** 0.445**
ST ‐0.011** 0.084* 0.354 ‐0.013** 0.036 ‐0.047**
_CONS 2.289** 50.347** 42.275** 0.016 7.448** 3.198**
Observations 2089 2089 2089 2108 2108 2108
R‐2 0.136 0.471 0.374 0.162 0.439 0.619
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%
Table A.5 Estimation of Risk, Capital and Efficiency Equations with aggregated ND indices (no Principal Components)
1. ineft as the efficiency variable 2. ac as the efficiency variable
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